Ważne wnioski z raportu:
The AIVD’s information indicates that the Separatists were procuring an increasing number of weapons in the months prior to the crash. Furthermore, a connection could be made between the intensifi cation of the fi ght against the Separatists by the Ukrainian armed forces. In April 2014, the Ukrainian government launched its so-called anti-terrorism operation in Eastern Ukraine, aimed at isolating the Separatists. From May onwards, the Ukrainian armed forces increased their air operations. The Separatists gradually obtained more and better weapons with greater potential.
The AIVD was aware that the Separatists, in addition to a broad range of artillery (eg machine guns), light anti-aircraft artillery (e.g. rocket launchers), anti-tank weapons and tanks, also possessed MANPADS and possibly short-range vehicle-borne anti-aircraft systems. Both types of systems are considered surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Due to their limited range, the aforementioned weapons do not constitute a danger to civil aviation at cruising altitude.
On 16 July, the AIVD received a report from a reliable source that stated that there was no information that indicated that the Separatists possessed a medium-range SAM system. This comment was made in view of the circumstances related to the Ukrainian armed forces’ Antonov being shot down on 14 July 2014 in Eastern Ukraine.
The AIVD did not have any information that indicated that the Separatists possessed an operational, powerful anti-aircraft system such as a Buk system, also called an SA-11, prior to the crash of flight MH17. The AIVD had no indications that the Russian Federation had provided the Separatists with powerful anti-aircraft systems. There were no indications that they [Separatists] were being trained to use powerful anti-aircraft systems.
On 29 June 2014, the Separatists captured a Ukrainian armed forces military base in Donetsk. At this base, there were Buk missile systems.25 These are powerful anti-aircraft systems. This development was reported extensively in the media prior to the crash. The MIVD also received intelligence information on the subject, on 30 June and 3 July 2014 as well as on other dates. During the course of July, several reliable sources indicated that the systems that were at the military base were not operational. Therefore, they could not be used by the Separatists.
According to the MIVD’s information, the Ukrainian armed forces mainly possessed outdated resources,including, however, certain powerful anti-aircraft systems. A number of these systems were located in the eastern part of the country.
A więc bardziej prawdopodobne, że miałem rację odnośnie przyczyn. Rosja ani nie pwrzekazywałą, ani nie szkoliła, separatyści nie posiadali działającego Buka. Z kolei armia ukraińska posiadała w tym rejonie podobne systemy.